I wrote the following blog last year , but it was not published as I had expected because the umbrella group that was to publish it turned out to be negotiating for a large DFID grant as a consortia so this was kicked into the long grass as I discovered recently . In a way it shows that my fears were correct about the negative way such funding was being offered. Since then several private firms are being righty questioned over their performances even in their own key areas of expertise , and indeed consortia are being led by those able to pre fund programmes rather than those with the most obvious skills set .
Dr Brian Pratt 15/10/18
Consortia seem to be the latest donor fashion as at least the Dutch and British aid programmes are working to create consortia around themes of interest to their own aid programme priorities. The Dutch led the way when they dismantled their long term system of co-funding and framework grants . These were replaced by thematic calls with a strong emphasis on consortia. The British DFID have now followed suit with several programmes based on the idea that NGOs and others, including academic bodies, who once had the equivalent of framework funding (PPAs), should come together to bid for thematic funding .
At one level the logic of getting small niche agencies with specialised experience to come together with larger better resourced agencies as well as academic bodies seem to make a lot of sense . We are all aware of the danger of duplication but also a failure of agencies to learn from each other, not least from academic centres on the one hand and useful empirical experience on the other . We are however already seeing this process turn into a unseemly scramble for partners rather like an out of control dance with insufficient partners of the opposite sex to go around , or is the image one of musical chairs with people being unsure who would be sitting and standing at the end of the process.
There is already evidence that rather than achieving genuine coordination such an approach is encouraging greater competition , where those who have bigger incomes and reserves are most likely to be able to win the bids. This is enhanced in the case of the DFID by their adherence to a system of payments in arrears, whereas the earlier system of grants were paid in advance , hence the old system was better for charities with smaller reserve funds and less free income . It is hoped that DFID may revise this condition as it is particularly difficult for Charities which have always to maintain a keen balance of reserves , sufficient for their purposes but not too excessive in relationship to their overall turnover. Furthermore it is difficult under charity regulations to borrow against a results based framework if trustees are to ensure the care of their finances.
Some people have suggested to me that competition is indeed the aim of the current government who see everything in commercial terms rather than focussing on past track records . Todays winners tend to be those who can handle larger sums so as to reduce the transaction costs of DFID ( and I presume there are similar trends in domestic UK programmes), plus benefits commercial companies who are assumed to be a safer pair of hands. Incentives are now about delivering on a contract . It is regarded as important not to confuse matters with inconvenient factors such as values, principles and ensuring the right thing is carried out . Meanwhile the procedural obligations year on year become more burdensome , more expensive , less efficient and overall more frustrating for people with experience and a track record of getting things done . I can predict that agencies with a great deal of experience in some of the thematic areas will find themselves as second level participants in consortia led by those with sufficient funds , rather than leading themselves with their own ideas based on their experience and niche skills , contacts and track record.
I was involved in helping set up a programme in Bangladesh , where the original design from DFID assumed that we would also be setting up a series of formal coalitions each with a central lead local agency which would manage the programme around a thematic issue of importance in the country. The lead agency would manage on-granting to other members and would ensure consistent monitoring and evaluation and standardised formats for strategic plans, capacity building , results frameworks etc . Very quickly in our inception period we realised that in that context where competition already characterised the relationships between different civil society groups , a formal coalition with a lead agency “ distributing “ resources to other members was probably a recipe for disaster . Therefore we changed the design to allow for loose coalitions of people coming together around a common interest but with no single agency controlling the purse strings . This has worked better than we could have expected ,although we had to overcome some concerns from local agencies used to the old competitive tendering process with the winner taking all. Once the concept had been understood and after a few false starts, people have indeed come together around the issues of importance to them rather than just seeing this as another off the shelf grant making programme. In a way this is a more organic non-funding led development of consortia.
This change in the design of the programme in Bangladesh from formal coalitions to interest groups , has avoided the current situation in the UK and I suspect in the Netherlands, where those with the deepest pockets and loudest voices are likely to be inside the coalitions , and where the main concern of most participants is how much money they can squeeze from their participation , rather than the consortia being the result of a mature discussion over which of the potential partners come with the best ideas and proposals in terms of the needs and views of developing country partners and people . I would love to be proven wrong but I fear I will not be .
Brian Pratt 8/09/17
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